They're Not Aiming At The Boss
A mobile security company published its annual report this week, and two findings in it are worth a few minutes. Three quarters of the phone infections it counted this year were criminal rather than government. And in every business case it confirmed, the person affected was below managing-director level. Phone security has been sold as an executive problem for twenty years. The data says otherwise.
Phone security has always been sold upward. Protect the chief executive's phone. Worry about the partner who travels, too. The assumption is that an attacker picks a target by working out who is worth the trouble. A report published this week says that in every business case its authors confirmed, the person affected was below managing-director level. The second finding explains the first. Three quarters of the phone infections it counted were criminal rather than government — people after passwords and cryptocurrency, not state secrets. Criminals do not pick targets. They cast nets. Our interest, and we are declining it in public. The report's own recommendation is phone monitoring software, a category we sell. We are not recommending you buy any. For an office of twenty the free steps come first, and they are below. The technical part — you can skip this box The source is iVerify's "2026 Advanced Mobile Threat Report." We read the company's own page for it rather than a summary. The headline figures, in its words: "1.07" described as "iOS infections per 1,000 consumer devices"; "75%" described as "of detections were criminal, not state-sponsored"; and "100%" described as "of enterprise detections from criminal actors were rank-and-file employees." Its own key-findings text reads: "75% of this year's detections were criminals stealing credentials and cryptocurrency. In every enterprise case we confirmed, the person affected was an employee below managing director level." Two limits on those numbers, both of them stated by iVerify itself and both important. The page says "Prevalence figures describe the population iVerify monitors, not all iPhones," and separately that figures are "reported at the conservative lower end of our estimate." And the denominator is never given — "this year's detections" appears with no count of detections anywhere on the page we read, so three quarters of an unstated number is what is actually on offer. iVerify sells mobile security software, and these are its own product's detections across its own customers. On delivery, the page's heading reads "Ads now deliver exploits, no click required," and its text says "Targeted display ads can launch half-click attacks, where the exploit starts the moment an ad renders. iVerify recorded one served on Instagram while the user was simply scrolling." Note the tension inside the vendor's own wording — the heading says "no click required" and the mechanism is named a "half-click" attack — and note that reporting on the same research describes both paths. Help Net Security, published November 11, says "A DarkSword variant began infecting an iPhone when an Instagram ad loaded while its user was scrolling. The same person later clicked a link that delivered a different version of the toolkit," and separately describes a lure site that "quietly loaded a hidden page that checked for Safari on iOS 18.4.0 through 18.7.2, then launched the DarkSword exploit chain on matching iPhones." That version range is the range the attackers were checking for, not a list of versions that are still vulnerable, and we could find no published list of fixed versions at all — so there is no version table in this entry and you should be wary of anyone who gives you one. Two exploit toolkits are named, DarkSword and Coruna, both aimed at iPhones; iVerify says their exposure in March, and a leak of one of them to a public code-sharing site, "put government-grade iOS exploits in criminal hands." Help Net says one Coruna payload "searched text and images for recovery phrases." On Android, iVerify describes ordinary remote-access malware rather than exploit chains, with "no exploit needed." On restarting, which is the one piece of advice most likely to be garbled in retelling: Help Net says "A reboot or software update can remove the running malware and erase evidence that could help investigators reconstruct the attack." That is removal, not prevention. Nothing we read says a restart or an update stops you being infected in the first place. What that actually means The tools got cheap and the aim got wide. Software built to watch a few hundred people is now used against anyone whose accounts can be emptied. Which makes the person who answers your phone a better target than you are. She has the mailbox, the calendar, the supplier list and everybody's schedule, and nobody has told her she is a target. And a phone can be reached without its owner doing anything wrong. At least one infection in this report began while somebody was scrolling. The part that is actually good news Everything useful here is free and takes one evening. None of the steps below is a purchase. A phone with automatic updates on and a recent restart is a much harder target than the ones in this report. The gap between a phone somebody looks after and a phone nobody has opened in a year is most of the risk. The caveat, which is a check rather than a fear A restart clears malware that is running. It does not stop the next one arriving, and neither does an update. Anyone who says a reboot makes you safe has read half the sentence. So the check is not whether your phone is clean today. It is whether the phones that read your work mail are on automatic updates, and whether you could cut one off if it went missing on a Friday. What to do this week Turn on automatic updates on every phone that reads work email. Including the personal ones. Restart them. It costs a minute and it clears anything running that does not survive a reboot. Delete the photographs of passwords. Screenshots of logins live in a lot of camera rolls, and at least one of these toolkits went looking through images for exactly that. Decide who cuts off a phone that goes missing. If the answer is one person and they are on holiday, you have found the thing worth fixing. If we handle your systems, ask what happens to a phone's access when somebody leaves. If that takes more than a minute, it is worth knowing about us.